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ABSTRACT
In this paper, we study the problem of privacy-preserving
data sharing, wherein only a subset of the records in a
database are sensitive, possibly based on predefined pri-
vacy policies. Existing solutions, viz, differential privacy
(DP), are over-pessimistic and treat all information as sen-
sitive. Alternatively, techniques, like access control and per-
sonalized differential privacy, reveal all non-sensitive records
truthfully, and they indirectly leak information about sensi-
tive records through exclusion attacks.
Motivated by the limitations of prior work, we introduce
the notion of one-sided differential privacy (OSDP). We for-
malize the exclusion attack and we show how OSDP protects
against it. OSDP offers differential privacy like guarantees,
but only to the sensitive records. OSDP allows the truthful
release of a subset of the non-sensitive records. The sam-
ple can be used to support applications that must output
true data, and is well suited for publishing complex types of
data, e.g. trajectories. Though some non-sensitive records
are suppressed to avoid exclusion attacks, our experiments
show that the suppression results in a small loss in utility
in most cases. Additionally, we present a recipe for turning
DP mechanisms for answering counting queries into OSDP
techniques for the same task. Our OSDP algorithms lever-
age the presence of non-sensitive records and are able to offer
up to a 25× improvement in accuracy over state-of-the-art
DP-solutions.
1. INTRODUCTION
Public and private organizations capture and store diverse
types of information about individuals that are either obli-
gated to publish or could benefit from sharing with others
[20]. A key impediment in sharing is the concern of pri-
vacy. For instance, information about visited locations, on-
line purchases, movie preferences [35], or web searches [5]
has been shown to lead to inferences about sensitive prop-
erties like health, religious affiliation, or sexual orientation.
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In recent years, the field of privacy preserving data-sharing
has flourished and differential privacy [15] (DP) has emerged
as the predominant privacy standard. Informally, DP states
that for a database that contains a single record per user,
the participation of an individual will change the output of
an analysis by a bounded factor proportional to a privacy
parameter . Most work in differential privacy (with the ex-
ceptions of [4, 21]) has been developed under the assumption
that every record in the database is equally sensitive.
In this work, we depart from the above well trodden path,
as we consider data sharing when only part of the data is sen-
sitive, while the remainder (that may consist the majority)
is non-sensitive. In real-world scenarios, the sensitive/non-
sensitive dichotomy of data is not always apparent, but in
certain cases it naturally occurs as a consequence of legisla-
ture, personal preferences, convenience, and privacy policies.
Example 1. The General Data Protection Regulation [16,
30] (GDPR), that will take effect in European Union (EU)
in 2018, imposes strict rules on how information about EU
citizens is handled by companies. Individuals must provide
an affirmative consent (opt-in) in order to allow the collec-
tion and analysis of their data. Additionally, information
about minors under 16 years of age can not be stored and
processed without parental authorization. Failure to comply
with GDPR could ensue a fine of up to 4% of the company’s
annual turnover. The previous legislative rules can easily be
used to classify a citizen’s record as sensitive or not.
Example 2. In psychology literature, it is well established
that privacy attitudes depend on personal preferences and
convenience [2, 3]. In a large scale study in e-commerce [6],
researchers found two major groups of individuals: those
who had little to no privacy concerns and the “privacy fun-
damentalists”. Moreover, individuals’ tendency to opt-in or
opt-out of data sharing is a function of perception of utility
offered by an application versus the cost of privacy leakage.
Thus, if the gain is sufficient, a big portion of users will
willingly release their information.
Example 3. We examine the use case of privacy applica-
tions in a smart building management system [13] (SBMS).
Such systems, are capable of tracking individuals using in-
door localization sensors and devices. The collected infor-
mation is used to improve the performance of HVAC (heat-
ing, ventilation, and air conditioning) subsystems or offer
location based services to the tenants, such as allowing to
locate each other. SBMS need to comply with legislature,
e.g. GDPR, and privacy policies. For instance, individuals
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should not be tracked in certain locations (e.g. restrooms,
smoker lounge, etc.). Additionally, “privacy fundamental-
ists” can opt-out from the tracking system, at the expense
of enjoying only limited services.
In this paper, we use policies as the language for specifying
sensitivity. Traditionally, query answering in the presence of
policies has been the focus of access control literature [9, 33,
34]. The Truman and non-Truman models [33] are the two
primary models for query answering in access control. Based
on the Truman model, queries are transparently re-written
to ensure users only see what is contained in the authorized
view. Thus, the result is correct only with respect to the re-
stricted view. In non-Truman models queries that can not be
answered correctly are rejected. However, neither approach
guarantees privacy. Consider example 3, where the smoker’s
lounge is the only sensitive location and Alice is attempting
to locate Bob. If Bob is at the sensitive location, the Truman
model will return nothing and the non-Truman model will
honestly reject the query. Therefore, in both cases, Bob’s
location is indirectly revealed, because the sensitivity of his
record is correlated with the value of the record. This attack
is an example of what we call an exclusion attack , which we
formally define in section 3.2.
An alternative solution is to directly apply differential pri-
vacy. Such an approach would hide all properties of a record
(including its sensitivity) and protect against exclusion at-
tacks. However, DP algorithms do not leverage on the fact
that part of the data is non-sensitive to lower the error rates
of the query answers. In prior work, heterogeneous DP [4]
and personalized differential privacy (PDP) [21] have tried
to take advantage of different privacy levels between records.
Specifically, PDP [21] considers the case where each record
r is associated with its own privacy parameter (r). PDP,
for instance, allows suppressing records with strong privacy
requirements ((r) < t), and analyzing only the records with
weaker privacy requirements using a t-DP algorithm. In this
context, if we model non-sensitive records by setting their
privacy level to ∞, PDP would release all the non-sensitive
records unperturbed (which is an ∞-DP algorithm), which
results in an exclusion attack.
In general, the fundamental problem ignored by prior work
is that an individual’s privacy attitude (and hence the fact
that their records is sensitive or non-sensitive) can be cor-
related with attributes in their record (and whether they
are present or absent in the database). For instance in [32],
the authors note that an individual’s privacy preferences are
correlated to demographic attributes like income, age, and
political views.
In this paper, we make the following contributions:
1. Motivated by the shortcomings of existing solutions, we
introduce one-sided differential privacy (OSDP), a novel
privacy definition that provides rigorous privacy guar-
antees on the sensitive portion of the data, and guards
against exclusion attacks.
2. We develop a variant of the randomized response algo-
rithm, that can truthfully release a sample of the non-
sensitive data, while satisfying OSDP. We use this to
release and analyze mobility trajectories of users in the
context of smart buildings. DP algorithms are unable
to analyze these data with low error. In contrast, data
released under OSDP supports these analyses with rea-
sonably high accuracy, especially when the fraction of
sensitive data is small.
3. We propose a new general recipe for adapting DP al-
gorithms for answering counting queries to OSDP. Our
approach leverages on the non-sensitive records, and it is
able to improve state-of-the-art DP algorithms by up to
25× for certain inputs.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In
Section 2, we present differential privacy and its properties.
We define one-sided differential privacy in Section 3, prove
its composition properties, and discuss its relation to simi-
lar privacy definitions. In Section 3, we also formalize the
exclusion attack and we show how OSDP protects against
it. Section 4 contains an algorithm for releasing true data
under OSDP. In Section 5, we shift our focus on releasing
counting queries under OSDP. In Section 6, we empirically
evaluate our algorithms. Section 7 contains interesting new
directions of research and extensions to OSDP. In Section 8,
we summarize our contributions and experimental results.
2. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we introduce differential privacy (DP), its
composition properties, and a basic mechanism that satisfies
differential privacy.
We adopt the bounded model of differential privacy [14].
Let T be the universe of records, D be a database defined
as a multiset of records r ∈ T , and D be the universe of all
possible databases.
Definition 2.1 (Neighboring Databases). Databases D and
D′ are neighboring if they differ in the value of at most one
record. That is D′ = D\{r}∪{r′}. We denote the neighbors
of D as N(D).
Definition 2.2 (Differential privacy [14]). A randomized
algorithm M satisfies -differential privacy if for all D and
D′ ∈ N(D) and all O ⊆ range(M):
Pr[M(D) ∈ O] ≤ ePr[M(D′) ∈ O].
Where the probabilities are taken over coin tosses of M.
In DP,  plays the role of a privacy knob – with lower 
values corresponding to higher levels of privacy.
Theorem 2.1 (Sequential Composition [15]). LetM1, · · ·Mk
be a set of mechanisms such that Mi satisfies i-differential
privacy. Then M1 ◦ · · · ◦ Mk satisfies
∑k
i=1 i-differential
privacy.
A consequence of Theorem 2.1 is that complex DP algo-
rithms can be designed by sequentially composing simpler
algorithms on the data. For this reason, it is useful to con-
sider the privacy parameter  as a privacy budget that we
slowly spend by performing private analyses on the data.
Definition 2.3 (Laplace Distribution). The probability den-
sity function of the Laplace distribution with mean µ and
scale β is:
f(x;µ, β) =
1
2β
exp
(
− |x− µ|
β
)
For the remainder, we use Lap(β) to denote a random
variable drawn from the Laplace distribution with mean µ =
0 and scale β.
Definition 2.4 (Sensitivity). Given a function f : D → R,
the sensitivity of f is:
S(f) = max
D,D′∈N(D)
∥∥f(D)− f(D′)∥∥
1
Sensitivity is a property of a numerical function f , as it is
an upper bound to the output of f between any two neigh-
boring databases.
Definition 2.5 (Laplace Mechanism [14]). Consider a func-
tion f : D → Rd, for d ∈ N+, and database D. The Laplace
mechanism Laplace is defined as Laplace(D) = f(D)+z,
where z is a vector of d random variables s.t. ∀i : zi ∼
Lap(S(f)/).
The Laplace mechanism satisfies -differential privacy [14]
and is the standard mechanism for providing DP on tasks f
whose output is either a scalar or a vector of real numbers.
3. ONE-SIDED PRIVACY
In this section, we formally define one-sided differential
privacy (OSDP). In subsection 3.2, we define the exclusion
attack, and we prove that OSDP protects against it. Fur-
thermore, in subsection 3.3, we examine the composition
properties of OSDP and in 3.4 we compare and contrast
OSDP with related work.
3.1 Definition
Definition 3.1 (Policy Function). A policy function P :
T → {0, 1} denotes whether a record r ∈ T is sensitive
(P (r) = 0) or non-sensitive (P (r) = 1).
A policy function (or simply policy) classifies database
records as either sensitive or non-sensitive, examples of pol-
icy functions include:
• λr.if(r.Age ≤ 17) : 0; else : 1 encodes the policy that
records corresponding to minors are sensitive.
• λr.if(r.Race = NativeAmerican∨ r.Optin = False) :
0; else : 1 implies that all records who have either
opted out, or are native Americans are sensitive.
Policies considered in this work are non-trivial i.e., they
result in at least one sensitive and one non-sensitive record.
If all records are sensitive the private analysis can be done
with standard DP algorithms. Conversely, if all records are
non-sensitive then any non-private algorithm can be used.
Our goal is to design a privacy definition that provides
a rigorous privacy guarantee for the sensitive records (i.e.,
{r : P (r) = 0}∀r∈D). Towards that goal, we define one-sided
neighboring databases under policy P .
Definition 3.2 (One-sided P -Neighbors). Let D, D′ be two
databases and P a policy function. D′ is a one-sided P -
neighbor of D, i.e., D′ ∈ NP(D), if and only if ∃r ∈ D s.t.,
P (r) = 0, ∃r′ ∈ D′ s.t., r′ 6= r, and D′ = D\{r} ∪ {r′}.
One-sided neighbors under policy P are created by re-
placing a single sensitive record with any other possible
record. This implies that the NP relation is asymmetric,
i.e., D′ ∈ NP(D) does not imply D ∈ NP(D′). For instance,
if D contains only non-sensitive records then NP(D) = ∅.
On the other hand, D is the P -neighbor of every database
D′ with the same size as D, that differs from D by one
sensitive record.
Definition 3.3 (One-sided Differential Privacy). Let M be
a randomized algorithm. Algorithm M satisfies (P, )-one-
sided differential privacy, if and only if ∀O ⊆ range(M),
and ∀D,D′ ∈ NP(D):
Pr[M(D) ∈ O] ≤ e Pr[M(D′) ∈ O] (1)
Where the probabilities are taken over coin tosses of M.
Essentially, OSDP provides an indistinguishability prop-
erty similar to DP, but only for the sensitive records. As
we show in section 3.2, OSDP mechanisms not only “hide”
the value of sensitive records, but also the fact that they
are sensitive or not. Lastly, OSDP does not constraint the
information leakage of non-sensitive records as long as the
privacy of the sensitive records is preserved.
3.2 OSDP and the Exclusion Attack
In this subsection, we (a) formalize the notion of freedom
from exclusion attacks, (b) show that prior work fails to sat-
isfy it, and (c) show that all one-sided differentially private
algorithms satisfy it.
Exclusion Attacks: Informally, by exclusion attack we re-
fer to attacks where adversaries decrease their uncertainty
about the value of a sensitive record when that record is
excluded from a private release. In example 3, if smoker’s
lounge is the only sensitive location, then excluding Bob’s
data leaks information about his presence in the smoker’s
lounge. We formalize the concept of exclusion attacks by
formalizing its converse – i.e., when a mechanism is free of
exclusion attacks.
First we specify the background information of an adver-
sary. Let θ be a probability distribution that describes the
prior knowledge of an adversary. In general θ can be any
arbitrary function that maps a database to a real number in
[0, 1], i.e., θ : T n → [0, 1]. Informally, a mechanismM satis-
fies freedom from exclusion attacks if an attacker’s certainty
about whether a target record is sensitive increases by at
most a bounded amount after accessing M’s output. We
now formalize freedom from exclusion attack .
Definition 3.4 (φ-Freedom from Exclusion Attacks). A
mechanismM satisfies φ-freedom from exclusion attacks for
policy P and parameter φ if:
∀x : P (x) = 0, ∀y ∈ T , ∀O ⊆ range(M)
∀θ : Pr θ(r = x) > 0,Pr θ(r = y) > 0
Pr θ(r = x|M(D) ∈ O)
Pr θ(r = y|M(D) ∈ O) ≤ e
φPr θ(r = x)
Pr θ(r = y)
Where r is the target record, x is a value that makes the
record sensitive, y is another value in the domain, and θ is
the adversary’s prior about the database.
The definition states that the adversary should not reduce
his uncertainty about whether a record is sensitive after see-
ing the output of the mechanism by more than a multiplica-
tive factor of eφ. It follows, that a mechanism that reveals all
non-sensitive records is not free from exclusion attacks, since
there are datasets and outputs where Pθ(r = y|M(D) ∈ O)
becomes 0 for values y that are non-sensitive according to
the policy, resulting in an unbounded posterior odds-ratio.
OSDP and Freedom from Exclusion Attacks: Any
mechanism that satisfies (P, )-OSDP also satisfies -freedom
from exclusion attacks as long as the attacker does not know
any correlations between the target record and the rest of the
database. Suppose Θ denotes the set of probability distri-
butions over databases of the form θ(D) =
∏
t∈D θ(t), where
θ(t) is the adversary’s prior for tuple t. then we can show
the following:
Theorem 3.1. A mechanism satisfying (P, )-OSDP satis-
fies -freedom from exclusion attacks for policy P for all ad-
versaries whose prior can be expressed as a product of priors
over individual records (i.e., θ ∈ Θ).
Proof. Since the adversary’s prior can be decomposed into a
product of priors over individual records, we can show that:
Pr θ(r = x|M(D) ∈ O)
Pr θ(r = y|M(D) ∈ O) ≤
Pr θ(r = x)
Pr θ(r = y)
max
D,D′
PrM(M(D) ∈ O)
PrM(M(D′) ∈ O)
where D is a database where record r takes the value x and
D′ is a database where record r takes the value y. These
are precisely neighboring databases under OSDP (when x is
a sensitive record, and y is an arbitrary record). Thus,
Pr θ(r = x|M(D) ∈ O)
Pr θ(r = y|M(D) ∈ O) ≤
Pr θ(r = x)
Pr θ(r = y)
· e
The above proof also shows that all DP mechanisms also
satisfy -freedom from exclusion attacks for any policy.
The assumption that the adversary does not know any
correlations between the target record and the rest of the
database is critical. Prior work has shown a “No Free Lunch
Theorem” [24] that states that any mechanism that ensures
properties of records are protected against all possible ad-
versaries can not necessarily provide any useful information
about the data. To illustrate this, consider an -differentially
private mechanism that releases the number of non-sensitive
records (using the Laplace mechanism). Suppose the adver-
sary knows that either all the records are sensitive, or all
the records are non-sensitive. Under such a strongly cor-
related prior, the adversary can tell with high probability
whether a target record is sensitive (when the noisy count is
close to 0) or not. Thus, useful mechanisms can only ensure
freedom from exclusion attacks under some assumption on
the attacker prior. We prove freedom from exclusion attack
under the independence assumption (which is the standard
assumption used when proving semantic privacy properties
of differential privacy [25]). Considering freedom from ex-
clusion attacks when records are correlated is an interesting
direction for future work.
3.3 Composition
Much like DP, one-sided differential privacy also composes
with itself. First we define policy relaxations, which will help
us to compose OSDP instantiations with different policies.
Definition 3.5 (Policy Relaxation). Let P1, P2 be two pol-
icy functions. P1 is a relaxation of P2, denoted as P1 p P2,
if and only if for every record r, P1(r) ≥ P2(r).
If P1 is a relaxation of P2, then every record that is sen-
sitive under P1 is also sensitive under P2. We also say that
P1 is weaker than P2 or P2 is stricter than P1. Relaxing the
policy also results in a weaker privacy definition.
Theorem 3.2 (Privacy Relaxation). Let M be a (P2, )-
OSDP mechanisms, . If P1 p P2, then M2 also satisfies
(P1, )-OSDP.
Proof. If P1 p P2, then for every database D, NP1(D) ⊆
NP2(D). Thus based on Definition 3.2, M2 also satisfies
(P1, )-OSDP.
We next define the minimum relaxation of a pair of poli-
cies that are not relaxations of each other.
Definition 3.6 (Minimum Relaxation). Let P1, . . . , Pk be
a set of policy functions. We define the minimum relax-
ation as the policy function Pmr such that for every record
r, Pmr(r) = max(P1(r), . . . , Pk(r)).
The minimum relaxation of two policies, P1, P2 classifies
as sensitive the records that are sensitive under both policies.
Records that are deemed non-sensitive by either P1 or P2
are considered non-sensitive by Pmr(r). Pmr is the strictest
policy that is a relaxation of both P1 and P2. When P1 = P2,
then Pmr = P1 = P2. We are now ready to define the
sequential composition theorem for OSDP.
Theorem 3.3 (Sequential Composition). Let M1, . . . ,Mk
be (P1, 1), . . . , (Pk, k)-OSDP algorithms and Pmr the min-
imum relaxation of P1, . . . , Pk. Then the composition of
mechanisms MC = M1 ◦ . . . ◦ Mk satisfies (Pmr,
∑
i i)-
OSDP.
Proof. According to Theorem 3.2, every algorithmMi satis-
fies (Pmr, i)-OSDP. LetD be a database andD
′ ∈ NPmr (D),
then
Pr[M(D) = (x, y)]
Pr[M(D′) = (x, y)] =
∏
i
Pr[M1(D) = x]
Pr[M1(D′) = x] ≤ e
∑
i i
Thus M satisfies (Pmr, ∑i i)-OSDP.
3.4 Connection with other Privacy Definitions
In this subsection, we discuss the connection of OSDP
with other three similar privacy definitions: differential pri-
vacy, personalized differential privacy and blowfish privacy.
Differential Privacy: OSDP is a generalization of differ-
ential privacy; the latter is a special case of the former when
every record is sensitive as shown below.
Definition 3.7 (All Sensitive Policy). Let Pall denote the
policy function that classifies every record as sensitive.That
is, Pall(r) = 0, ∀r. We call this the all sensitive policy.
Lemma 3.1. Any -differential private mechanism also sat-
isfies (P, )-OSDP for any policy function P .
Proof. An -differentially private algorithm satisfies (Pall, )-
OSDP. Every policy P is a relaxation of Pall. Thus, by Theo-
rem 3.2, a mechanism that satisfies -differential private also
satisfies (P, )-OSDP.
Lemma 3.2. Any (Pall, )-OSDP private mechanism also
satisfies -differential privacy.
Proof. Neighboring datasets under DP (Def. 2.1) are also
Pall-one-sided neighbors (Def. 3.2). Then any mechanism
that satisfies -indistinguishability between any two Pall-
one-sided neighboring datasets also satisfies -indistinguisha-
bility between any two neighboring datasets.
Differential privacy is the strictest form of OSDP and any
differential private algorithm will also satisfy any version of
one-sided differential privacy for the same .
Personalized Differential Privacy (PDP) [21]: In PDP
different records in the dataset are allowed different levels
of privacy. This is modeled by a publicly known function Φ
that associates records r with a personalized privacy level
Φ(r) = r – i.e., every record must publicly “declare” its pri-
vacy level independent of its value. However, in the privacy
model of OSDP the fact that a record is sensitive or not is
secret. This the key distinction between OSDP and PDP.
To explain this further, while it seems one can model
(P, )-OSDP using PDP with function ΦP that associates
sensitive records with privacy parameter , and non-sensi-
tive records with a privacy parameter of∞, we can construct
mechanisms that satisfy ΦP -PDP, but not (P, )-OSDP. For
example, consider the following algorithm: Suppress that
picks a threshold τ , suppresses all sensitive records with pri-
vacy parameter r < τ , and then runs a τ -differentially pri-
vate computation on the rest of the records. Then for τ =∞
Suppress will suppress all sensitive records and permit the
release of the non-sensitive records with no perturbation.
While Suppress satisfies ΦP -PDP, since it is a special case
of the Threshold algorithm [21], it fails to satisfy OSDP.
A second key difference is that while all OSDP mecha-
nisms enjoy -freedom from exclusion attacks, PDP is a def-
inition that allows algorithms that are susceptible to exclu-
sion attacks. It naturally follows from Definition 3.4 that
Suppress with τ =∞ is vulnerable to exclusion attacks.
Even in the case where one chooses a large but finite value
for τ , Suppress satisfies Definition 3.4 only for φ = τ and
hence does not satisfy (P, )-OSDP, which requires all mech-
anisms to satisfy freedom from exclusion attacks for φ = .
Theorem 3.4. The Suppress algorithm with threshold τ
satisfies freedom from exclusion attack for φ = τ .
Since Suppress provides a τ indistinguishability property
for the non-sensitive records, it follows that it only enjoys
τ -freedom of exclusion attacks. We defer details of the proof
to the full paper.
Blowfish Privacy [17, 19]: Recent work has considered
generalizations of differential privacy by modifying the no-
tion of neighboring datasets. One example is Blowfish Pri-
vacy, where the notion of neighboring datasets is captured
using a graph theoretic construct also called a policy. Un-
like an OSDP policy, which encodes whether a record is
sensitive or not, a Blowfish policies specify which properties
of records are sensitive (for instance, whether neighboring
databases must differ in the entire record, or just in a single
attribute of a record). While OSDP policies provide var-
ied privacy protection to different records, Blowfish policies
permit the same level of privacy for all records. Finally,
unlike OSDP, in Blowfish privacy the resulting neighboring
database relation is symmetric.
Other Related Work: In [8] the authors consider a new
privacy model for releasing exact value of outliers in a data-
stream while preserving the privacy of the rest of the data.
We conjecture that releasing exact values of outliers leads to
vulnerability to exclusion attacks to the rest of the records
and defer a full proof as future work. Our notion of ex-
clusion attacks is also reminiscent of how denial of query
answering reveals information about records in the context
of query auditing. To limit this leakage simulatable auditing
has been proposed [23]but the algorithms proposed in that
work cannot be applied in our setting. Lastly, in [11], [10]
the authors consider the private release of data where only
a subset of the attributes are sensitive. This is in contrast
to the data model we adopt where the sensitive/non-sensi-
tive distinction occurs on a per tuple basis. Note that unlike
OSDP, the privacy notions proposed in these papers are de-
fined as properties of the output of a mechanism, do not
support composition properties, and do not protect against
adversaries with side information.
4. RELEASING TRUE DATA
In this section, we introduce OsdpRR, a randomized re-
sponse based algorithm that satisfies OSDP. OsdpRR works
by releasing a true sample of the non-sensitive records in the
database. The ability to output a true data sample, while
ensuring privacy, enables a new class of privacy preserving
analysis tasks that require true data records. Examples of
such tasks include the creation of extractive summaries [27,
36], classification, or releasing histograms over very large
domains and with very large sensitivity. In Section 6.3, we
empirically show the advantages of using OsdpRR for the
last two cases.
Algorithm 1 OsdpRR (D,P, )
1: S ← {}
2: for r ∈ D do
3: if P (r) = 1 then
4: S ← S ∪ {r} with probability 1− e−
5: end if
6: end for
7: return S
OsdpRR is described in Algorithm 1. The inputs to
OsdpRR are a database D, a policy function P , and the pri-
vacy parameter . In lines 2 to 6, OsdpRR iterates through
every record in the database. Non-sensitive records, i.e.
P (r) = 1, are added to the output set S with probability
equal to 1− e−. In all other cases the record is ignored.
Theorem 4.1. OsdpRR satisfies (P, )-OSDP.
Proof. Let D be a database with size equal to 1, i.e., it con-
tains a single record. In that case we represent neighboring
databases as records r, r′. There are only two possible out-
puts, either release record r or suppress it (that we denote
as OsdpRR(r) = ∅). If r is non-sensitive then r has no
neighbors (see Definition 3.2). Thus, we are interested only
in cases that r is sensitive (P (r) = 0) and r′ is any possi-
ble record, such that r 6= r′. Based on OsdpRR’s possible
outputs, we have the following cases:
Case 1: OsdpRR(r) = r and r is sensitive. If r is sensitive
Pr[OsdpRR(r) = r] = 0, thus equation (1) holds trivially.
Case 2.1: OsdpRR(r) = ∅ and r, r ′ are sensitive.
Pr[OsdpRR(r) = ∅]
Pr[OsdpRR(r′) = ∅]
= 1 ≤ e
Case 2.2: OsdpRR(r) = ∅ and r is sensitive, r ′ is non
sensitive.
Pr[OsdpRR(r) = ∅]
Pr[OsdpRR(r′) = ∅]
=
1
e−
= e
Table 1: Percentage of released non-sensitive (ns) records
using OsdpRR vs .
privacy parameter  1.0 0.5 0.1
% of released ns records ∼ 63% ∼ 39% ∼ 9.5%
This concludes the proof for the case that |D| = 1. Next,
we extend the proof for any possible database size. Let D,
D′ be two neighbors, that differ on the kth record. Let
S = {s1, s2, . . .} be a possible output, with si being the
output for the ith record. Since OsdpRR makes independent
decisions for each record, we have the same result whether
OsdpRR is applied to the complete database or each record
separately. Thus we have
Pr[OsdpRR(D) = S]
Pr[OsdpRR(D′) = S]
=
Pr[OsdpRR(rk) = sk]
Pr[OsdpRR(r′k) = sk]
≤ e
This concludes the proof.
The probability distribution of the sample size, released
by OsdpRR, is the Bernoulli distribution with probability
of success equal to 1− e− and number of trials equal to the
number of non-sensitive records. Table 1 shows the expected
percentage of released non-sensitive data as a function of
privacy parameter . For  equal to 1.0, the percentage is
as high as 63%, while for low epsilon values ( = 0.1), the
percentage drops to approximately 9.5%.
5. ANSWERING COUNTING QUERIES
We shift our focus on the task of releasing histograms over
a dataset. We define a histogram query to be a set of counts
defined over a non-overlapping partitioning of the dataset.
One could think of a histogram query as:
SELECT group, COUNT(*)
FROM TABLE WHERE 〈condition〉
GROUP BY 〈keys〉
where the output reports all groups with both zero and non-
zero counts.
Histogram estimation under differential privacy is a well
researched area with rich literature to draw from. Hay et al
[18] present a near-complete benchmark comparison of dif-
ferentially private algorithms. The algorithms examined in
[18] are sophisticated, over-engineered algorithms that per-
mit the release of accurate low-dimensional histograms –
specifically, 1- or 2-dimensional histograms with the num-
ber of bins in the thousands. As shown in Lemma 3.1, any
DP algorithm for histogram release will satisfy OSDP. In
this section, we develop OSDP algorithms that leverage on
the presence of non-sensitive records to provide lower error
than even the state-of-the-art DP algorithms for this task.
One would expect that in the presence of non-sensitive
records histogram release becomes automatically easier, but
this is not the case as we identify two main issues with re-
leasing histogram estimates under OSDP. First, even in the
presence of a single sensitive record the global sensitivity
of releasing a count is still 1 (and the sensitivity of a his-
togram is still 2). In Section 5.1 we show that the sensitivity
can be reduced by answering queries only on non-sensitive
records. This helps when some of the bins in the histogram
have exclusively sensitive records and some bins have ex-
clusively non-sensitive records. We can then use a DP algo-
rithm for the bins with sensitive records, and an OSDP algo-
rithm (from Section 5.1) for bins with non-sensitive records.
However, in most cases, every bin the histogram could have
a mix of sensitive and non-sensitive records. This occurs,
for instance, when the policy is derived from an opt-in/opt-
out scenario. Another example is when the policy depends
on a single attribute (like race), while the histogram is con-
structed on a different attribute (like age). This might result
in big discrepancies between the distribution of non-sensitive
records and the distribution of sensitive records and using
just non-sensitive records as a proxy for the entire data will
result in high error. For such cases, in Section 5.2 we present
a general recipe for improving the error of state-of-the-art
DP algorithms by leveraging non-sensitive records, and re-
laxing their privacy guarantee to OSDP.
5.1 OSDP Primitives
OsdpRR can be used to release histograms by running
the query on the sample of non-sensitive records output by
OsdpRR. However, this approach can be worse than the
Laplace mechanism in many cases.
Theorem 5.1. Let n = |D| denote the number of records
in database D, and d denote the number of bins in the his-
togram query. Then the expected L1 error of computing the
histogram on the output of an OsdpRR algorithm that sat-
isfies (P, )-OSDP is higher than the expected L1 error of
Laplace mechanism that satisfied -DP, whenever:
n ·  > 2d · e (2)
Proof. The expected L1 error of Laplace mechanism is 2d/.
In the case of OSDP, error is due to (a) the suppression of all
sensitive records, and (b) suppression of n ·e− non-sensitive
records. Even if the number of sensitive records tends to
zero, the L1 error of OsdpRR is at least n · e−.
For instance, a 2-d histogram query over a uniform grid
that divides each dimension into 100 disjoint bins would
have d = 104. When  = .1, OsdpRR will have higher error
than the Laplace mechanism if n > 2.2× 105.
For the remainder we use x to denote the histogram over
all records in D, and xns over the non-sensitive records of D
alone. Note that under OSDP, a database D′ ∈ NP (D) is a
neighbor of D in one of two ways: (a) a sensitive record in
D is replaced with another sensitive record in D′, or (b) a
sensitive record in D is replaced with a non-sensitive record
in D′. Thus, if xns (x′ns) denotes the output of a histogram
query over the non-sensitive records of D (D′, resp.), then
the neighboring histograms differ in at most one count, and
all counts in x′ns are no smaller than the counts in xns.
Thus, we can release histogram counts on the non-sensitive
records by adding one-sided Laplace noise to ensure OSDP.
The one-sided Laplace distribution, Lap−(λ), is the mir-
rored version of exponential distribution with scale equal to
λ, where all the mass is on the negative values.
Definition 5.1 (One-Sided Laplace Distribution). The prob-
ability density function of the One-Sided Laplace Distribu-
tion is:
fLap−(x;λ) =
{
1
λ
exp
(
x
λ
)
if x ≤ 0
0 otherwise
The OsdpLaplace answers queries by adding one-sided
noise to the query answer computed only using non-sensitive
records.
Definition 5.2 (OsdpLaplace ). Let D be a database, P
a policy, Dns = {r ∈ D | P (r) = 1} the subset of non-
sensitive records. The OsdpLaplace answers a histogram
query with d bins, by computing the histogram on the non-
sensitive records Dns, and adding a vector of d i.i.d. random
variables drawn from Lap−(λ).
Theorem 5.2. For λ = 1/ OsdpLaplace satisfies (P, )-
OSDP.
Proof. Let D,D′ P -neighboring databases. Let x (x′) de-
note the true non-sensitive histogram on D (D′). For sim-
plicity, let M be an alias for OsdpLaplace. Note that
range(M(D,P )) ⊆ range(M(D′, P )) since ∀i, xi ≤ x′i. Let
y ∈ range(M(D′, P )), then there are two cases:
Case 1. ∃i : xi < yi ≤ x′i. Then, Pr[M(D) = y] = 0, thus
equation (1) holds trivially.
Case 2. ∀i : yi ≤ xi
Pr[M(D) = y]
Pr[M(D′) = y] =
∏
i
exp ( · (yi − xi))∏
i
exp ( · (yi − x′i))
≤ exp ( · ‖x′ − x‖1) ≤ exp()
It is easy to see that the OsdpLaplace mechanism intro-
duces noise with 1/8 the variance of the differentially private
Laplace mechanism. The exponential distribution has half
the variance, and another factor of 4 reduction in variance
comes from the sensitivity dropping from 2 (in the case of
DP) to 1 (in the case of OSDP). The error can be further
reduced by using the following algorithm that we call Os-
dpLaplaceL1 that leverages the fact that all input counts
are non-negative.
Algorithm 2 OsdpLaplaceL1 (xns, )
1: x˜ns = xns + Lap−(1/)d
2: x˜ns[x˜ns < 0.0] = 0.0
3: µ = − ln(2) · 1/
4: x˜ns[x˜ns > 0.0] −= µ
5: return x˜ns
Step 2 of the algorithm sets all negative counts after adding
noise to 0. Note that after this step, every count in xns
that was originally 0 is also output as 0. However, there
could be other bins that are output as 0 (since their noisy
count was negative). Next, note that the one-sided Laplace
distribution is not unbiased, step 4 adds back the median
value µ of a one-sided Laplace random variable to make
the positive noisy counts unbiased. While OsdpLaplace
and OsdpLaplaceL1 add significantly lower noise than the
Laplace mechanism, they can have higher overall error than
the Laplace mechanism since they only use the non-sensitive
records to answer queries.
5.2 A Recipe for OSDP Algorithms
We now explore how to utilize the rich literature of DP
algorithms in order to build new OSDP algorithms that take
advantage of the presence of non-sensitive records in order
to reduce the added noise when applicable.
We focus on an important class of DP algorithms for his-
togram release that can be abstracted to two distinct phases.
In the first phase they query a set of statistics on the data
and learn an underlying model of it. Then they use the
learnt model and the Laplace mechanism to add noise to a
set of associated aggregate counts which will be used to es-
timate the private histogram. Examples of these algorithms
include: PrivBayes[37] for high dimensional histograms,
AGrid[28] for 2 dimensional histograms, AHP[38] for gen-
eral histograms, and DAWA for 1 and 2 dimensional his-
tograms. Algorithms of this type can be extended under
OSDP in the following way.
The naive extension replaces the noise addition step with
an OSDP primitive and changes the input histogram to xns.
This extension is easy to implement as it treats the under-
lying DP algorithm as a black box, requiring from the user
just a minor change. However, it suffers from the same prob-
lem other OSDP primitives do: if x and xns are dissimilar
then the incurred error will be high.
We now describe our second, more elaborate extension
that enhances the performance of established DP algorithms
for releasing histograms. Let A be a two-phase algorithm as
described earlier, we extend it as follows. First, we dedicate
a fraction ρ of the privacy budget to release the histogram
of xns using an OSDP primitive from section 5.1. We use
this noisy histogram to compute the set of zero count bins
Z. Then, we use the rest of the privacy budget to run the
algorithm A. At the end of this process we get a set of zero
bins Z generated under (P, ρ · )-OSDP, and the noisy out-
put of A under (1− ρ)-DP. Before releasing the final noisy
histogram, we add a post-processing step that (a) sets to
zero all the counts of bins in Z, (b) uses the learned model
to update the rest of the counts accordingly i.e., we redis-
tribute the value of the counts we removed. By sequential
composition the entire algorithm satisfies (P, )-OSDP.
We apply this second technique to extend the DAWA al-
gorithm, the state-of-the-art DP algorithm for this task [18].
We leave extensions of other algorithms as an interesting di-
rection of future work. We call this new OSDP algorithm
DAWAz (Alg. 3). DAWAz executes an OSDP subroutine
to get the zero count cells Z and executes DAWA on the
full histogram to get x¯. Then, DAWAz examines the noisy
estimate returned from the OSDP subroutine, finds the bins
with 0 count and replaces their values on x¯ with 0. Lastly,
for every DAWA partition DAWAz finds the number of re-
placed bins in that partition and reallocates the mass total
count of the partition to the non replaced bins.
Theorem 5.3. DAWAz satisfies (P, )-OSDP.
Proof. Running the OSDP algorithm satisfies (P, ρ·)-OSDP,
while the histogram construction using DAWA satisfies (1−
ρ)-DP. The rest of the algorithm is post-processing. Thus,
the proof follows from sequential composition theorem.
6. EXPERIMENTS
We use real and benchmark datasets to empirically demon-
strate that the OSDP algorithms presented in this paper
permit accurate data analysis of private datasets by lever-
aging the presence of non-sensitive records. We show:
Algorithm 3 DAWAz(x,xns, , ρ)
1: 1 ← ρ · 
2: 2 ← (1− ρ) · 
3: x˜ns ← Osdp(xns, 1)
4: x¯← DAWA(x, 2)
5: Z = {i | x˜ns = 0}
6: ∀i ∈ Z : x¯i = 0
7: Let B the set of partitions returned from DAWA.
8: for ∀B ∈ B do
9: rescale ratio = |B||Z∩B|
10: ∀i ∈ B : x¯i = x¯i · rescale ratio
11: end for
12: return x¯
• OsdpRR allows the release of true data records, which
permits building classifiers with high accuracy close to
that of a non-private baseline (Section 6.3.1). In contrast,
a state of the art DP classifier (that considers all the data
as sensitive) has accuracy close to that of a baseline that
does not have access to the data.
• OsdpRR’s output also permits releasing high dimensional
histograms with an order of magnitude smaller error than
that of a DP algorithm on the same data (Section 6.3.2)
• We also consider answering low dimensional histogram
queries, a task where over-engineered DP algorithms achieve
highly competitive error rates. We show that OSDP al-
gorithms outperform state of the art DP algorithms (Sec-
tion 6.3.3). In a comparison of 4 OSDP algorithms and 2
DP algorithms on a set of benchmark datasets, DAWAz
has on average less than 2× the error compared to the
optimal error achieved by any one of these algorithms. In
contrast, the state-of-the-art DP algorithm for this task
DAWA, incurs 6× the error of the optimal (Fig. 7a). In
some cases we observe that OSDP algorithms achieve up
to 25× lower error rate than DAWA (Fig. 9a).
We describe the datasets and the policy functions used in
Section 6.1, the analysis tasks in Section 6.2, and the results
in Section 6.3.
6.1 Datasets and Privacy Policies
We use two datasets: TIPPERS, a real dataset from a live
IoT testbed under development at UCI [1], and DPBench-
1D, a set of 7 one-dimensional real histograms, used to
benchmark the performance of DP algorithms [18, 26].
6.1.1 TIPPERS
Dataset: The TIPPERS dataset consists of a trace of dis-
tinct devices connected to 64 Wi-Fi access points located in
the Bren Hall building at UC Irvine collected over a 9 month
period from January to September of 2016. Each Wi-Fi
trace consist of a triple 〈AP mac, device mac, timestamp〉 1
and we use them to construct a total of 585K unique daily
trajectories with 16K unique users. Users might connect to
the same access point multiple times, or might cross areas
covered by multiple access points. To address this, we dis-
cretized time to 10 minute intervals and set the location at
each interval as the most frequent access point during that
time.
1the device mac is pseudo-anonymized to meet the IRB re-
quirements for this study
Table 2: Histogram Benchmark
Dataset Sparsity Scale
Adult 0.98 17,665
Hepth 0.21 347,414
Income 0.45 20,787,122
Nettrace 0.97 25,714
Medcost 0.75 9,415
Patent 0.06 27,948,226
Searchlogs 0.51 335,889
Privacy Policy: We consider a user’s daily trajectory as
the object of privacy protection. Thus, neighboring databases
under DP differ in a single user’s daily trajectory on a spe-
cific day. This protects all properties of an individual within
the time period of a specific day. We use access-point level
policies to partition the dataset to its sensitive and non-
sensitive parts. More specifically, our policies assume a
sensitive set of access points (e.g., lounge or restroom) and
classify as sensitive all trajectories that pass at least once
through a sensitive access point. Based on this general
recipe we define a policy Pρ, that results in a non-sensitive
dataset with ρ/100 share of non-sensitive records (e.g., P99
results in a dataset with 99% non-sensitive daily trajecto-
ries). In our experiments we use ρ = {99, 90, 75, 50, 25, 10, 1}
to capture different fractions of non-sensitive records.
6.1.2 DPBench-1D
Dataset: We use the DPBench benchmark datasets [18] to
evaluate the performance of our algorithms for the task of
releasing 1-D histograms. This benchmark has a collection
of 7 datasets. Tuples in each of these datasets are drawn
from a categorical domain with size 4,096. The datasets are
of varying scales (i.e., number of records), sparsity (i.e., frac-
tion of the total domain that does not appear in the active
domain of the dataset) and shape (i.e., empirical distribu-
tion), as detailed in table 2.
Privacy Policy: These datasets were originally used to
benchmark DP algorithms, and hence do not have any no-
tion of a policy. We simulate opt-in/opt-out policies by sam-
pling a subset of the records as non-sensitive. We denote by
x the true histogram (on d = 4096 bins), and by xns the
histogram over the non-sensitive records. We use two bi-
ased sampling methods to generate xns: MSampling, where
the empirical distribution of xns is close to that of x, and
HiLoSampling, where the empirical distribution of xns sig-
nificantly differs from that of x. MSampling simulates the
scenario when an individual’s opt-in/opt-out preference has
a low correlation with their value, while HiLoSampling sim-
ulates the case where the privacy preference is highly corre-
lated with the individual’s record value. We call the former
policy Close, and the latter policy Far.
MSampling takes as input a histogram x, a sampling
ratio ρx, and a parameter θ, and outputs x
′, a sample of
x with ‖x′‖1 = ρx‖x‖1. The mean µ′ and the standard
deviation σ′ of x′ are within a 1± θ multiplicative factor of
the mean µ and standard deviation σ of x. We use θ = 0.1.
HiLoSampling works differently, its input is again the
histogram x and the sampling ratio ρx and two additional
parameters γ > 1 and β. This technique partitions the
domain of the histogram into “High” and “Low” regions.
The algorithm picks a bin b at random and sets the bins in
the range b±d ·β as “High” bins. Every bin not in the High
region is automatically in the Low region. Then, we proceed
by sampling with replacement from bins of the histogram,
bins of the “High” area are sampled with weight γ , while
bins of the “Low” area are sampled with weight 1. Choosing
a high γ and a smaller β allows us to create an xns that is
highly dissimilar from x. We set γ = 5 and β = .4.
For each policy, we use 7 different values of ρx: {0.99, 0.90,
0.75,0.50, 0.25, 0.10, 0.01}. Thus, for each of the 7 datasets
we have 7× 2 = 14 different non-sensitive histograms for a
total of 98 (x,xns) pairs to evaluate our algorithms on.
6.2 Analysis Tasks
Classification: First we consider a classification task on
the TIPPERS dataset: based on a user’s daily trajectory
we classify whether the user is a resident or a visitor. More
specifically, we learn a logistic regression (LR) model to pre-
dict whether a daily trajectory corresponds to a resident.
Due to IRB restrictions, we do not have access to the true
identities of the owners of each device mac in the data. For
that reason, to create the training data we classify as resi-
dents owners of device mac that (a) visit Bren Hall at least
10 days per month for the last 5 months and either (b) work
beyond 7pm once a week, or (c) work more than 6 hours at
once per week; every other user is classified as a visitor. In
total, we detected 381 residents that correspond to ∼ 43K
daily trajectories (out of ∼ 553K total daily trajectories).
We use the following features derived from the daily tra-
jectories: duration of stay at Bren Hall, distinct number of
access points visited during a day, and the number of times
each individual access point is visited in a trajectory. We
also consider frequent patterns of the form (AP1, AP2, AP3)
from the trajectories. A trajectory satisfies a frequent pat-
tern if it visits the three access points during the day at
consecutive time intervals. We chose patterns that appear
in at least 50 trajectories and construct a feature for each
pattern using the number of times the pattern appears in a
daily trajectory.
We evaluate the performance of all LR classifiers using
the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve, that is
created by plotting the true positive rate versus the false
positive rate for multiple thresholds over the probability of
predicting a test record as belonging to a resident. The
accuracy is usually reported using the average area under
the ROC curve (AUC) over 10-fold cross validation, which
is a value between [0, 1]. We report 1.0−AUC as a measure
of prediction error.
High Dimensional Histograms: We also consider the
task of privately releasing high dimensional histograms on
the TIPPERSdataset. More specifically, we consider the
number of distinct users for every n consecutive access points
in a trajectory (i.e., the n-gram). This is a highly non-trivial
task since (a) the domain size for an n-gram is 64n and
(b) the histogram over all bins has sensitivity 64n since a
user might appear in all n-grams. We use the mean relative
error (MRE) to measure the quality of our private n-gram
estimates. More specifically, for a histogram x of size d and
its private estimate x˜, we have:
MRE(x, x˜) =
1
d
d∑
i=1
|xi − x˜i|/max(xi, δ)
In our experiments, we set δ = 1 and report the average
MRE over 10 independent executions.
Low Dimensional Histograms: We also evaluate our al-
gorithms on releasing 1 and 2-D histograms under OSDP.
Our goal is twofold, we want to: evaluate the performance
of OSDP algorithms in a realistic scenario and explore un-
der which conditions OSDP algorithms offer advantages over
their DP counterparts. Towards these goals we use his-
tograms from both the benchmark datasets and TIPPERS.
More specifically, we used TIPPERSto generate a 2-D his-
togram that contains the number of distinct users that con-
nected to every access point and for every hour of a single
day. For the DPBench-1D datasets, we consider the task of
releasing 1-D histograms. In addition to MRE defined ear-
lier, we also use per bin-relative error to measure the utility
of the algorithms. Per-bin relative error is defined as a vec-
tor with the same size as the input histogram, and contains
one relative error value per bin. More specifically:
Rel(x, x˜) =
[|xi − x˜i|/max(xi, δ)]i∈[d]
We report the median (Rel50) and 95% (Rel95) of the per-
bin relative error to capture the average and worst-case em-
pirical per-bin errors. For our experiments we ran each algo-
rithm 10 times on each input and estimate the value of the
loss function by taking the average across the executions, we
also use δ = 1.0.
6.3 Experimental Results
6.3.1 Classification
Algorithms: We compare four algorithms. 1) All NS is
a baseline that does not satisfy OSDP that runs a non-pri-
vate classifier on all the non-sensitive records. This captures
the threshold algorithm that satisfies personalized DP [21].
Recall that personalized DP is susceptible to the exclusion
attack. 2) OsdpRR is our OSDP strategy of releasing true
non-sensitive records using OsdpRR and then running a
non-private classifier. 3) ObjDP is an implementation of
the objective perturbation technique for differentially pri-
vate empirical risk minimization [12]. As prescribed by the
authors, we normalized feature vectors to ensure the norm
is bounded by 1 before running the method on our dataset.
4) Random is a baseline that randomly predicts a label based
on just the label distribution (and ignoring all the features).
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Figure 1: AUC metric for residents classification.
Results: In Figure 1, we report the error (1−AUC) for the
policies described in Section 6.1.1 for two levels of privacy
budget,  = 1.0 and  = 0.01. In each figure, we plot All NS
and OsdpRR using bars, as their accuracy differs based on
the fraction of non-sensitive records in the dataset. We re-
port the error of ObjDP and Random using a straight line.
We see that OsdpRRachieves as low an error as the non-
private baseline All NS, and the absolute errors are close to
10%. As expected, as the fraction of non-sensitive records
decreases the error increases (as the number of records used
by both All NS and OsdpRRto train the LR model de-
creases). ObjDP has high error close to that of the Random
baseline. This shows that treating all records as sensitive
results in a high error and OSDP algorithms alleviate this
problem by leveraging on non-sensitive records.
6.3.2 High Dimensional Histograms
Algorithms: As noted earlier, under DP the sensitivity of
an n-gram histogram is 64n. for that reason, we use trun-
cation [22] and choose at most k n-grams from each daily
trajectory. This step reduces the sensitivity of releasing the
n-gram to 2 · k. We report the MRE of the Laplace mech-
anism with truncation of k = 1 (denoted by LM T1). We
also report the MRE of Laplace mechanism with the opti-
mal choice of k for truncation (denoted by LM T*), this
approach does not satisfy DP. Given the high domain size,
it is intractable to materialize and perturb the complete his-
togram for LM when n is large. In our experiments, we only
materialize non-zero counts, so for the MRE computation we
analytically computed the contribution of the zero counts to
it.
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Figure 2: Mean Relative Error 4-grams.
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Figure 3: Mean Relative Error 5-grams.
Results: In Figures 2, 3, we plot the MRE error of the
4-grams and 5-grams for all policies considered. We report
All NS and OsdpRRerror using bars, and the errors of
LM T1 and LM T* using straight lines – since the DP algo-
rithms’ error is independent of the policy used. We observed
that the optimal choice of truncation parameter k for the 4-
and 5-gram counting task was k = 1. We see that All NS
has error smaller than OsdpRR, but the difference is not
too large when there are 10-50% sensitive records in the
dataset. When  = 1, LM algorithms has error compara-
ble to OsdpRR, when 50% of the records are non-sensitive.
For  = 0.01, the LM algorithms have an order of mag-
nitude poorer performance than the OsdpRR algorithm.
Thus, we see again that leveraging on the presence of non-
sensitive records results in significant utility gains. We did
not consider more sophisticated DP techniques for releas-
ing high-dimensional histograms. We believe their error will
also be an order of magnitude larger than the OSDP algo-
rithm, since they will also have to contend with the high
sensitivity and would need to use truncation.
6.3.3 Low Dimensional Histograms
Algorithms: For the task of releasing low dimensional his-
tograms, we compare a total of 4 OSDP and 2 DP algo-
rithms. The DP algorithms are: Laplace mechanism and
DAWA, the state of the art DP algorithm for this task ac-
cording to a recent benchmark study [18]. The OSDP al-
gorithms are: OsdpRR, OsdpLaplace, OsdpLaplaceL1
and DAWAz. For DAWAz we used ρ = 0.1 fraction of the
privacy budget to run OsdpRR to estimate the set of zero
counts in the histogram.
6.3.3.1 Results: TIPPERS.
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Figure 4: Mean Relative Error on the TIPPERS histogram.
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Figure 5: Relative per Bin Error for the TIPPERS his-
togram at α percentile, for  = 1.
Figure 4 reports the mean relative error for two differ-
ent values of the privacy parameter:  ∈ {1, 0.01} across all
policies. We see that for  = 1 the OSDP algorithms out-
perform the DP algorithm for policies with more than 25%
non-sensitive records, but for smaller fractions the DP al-
gorithm is clearly more competitive. The insight from this
result is that for datasets with mainly sensitive records, us-
ing a DP algorithm is preferable. In Fig. 4b we report our
findings for  = 0.01 where again the OSDP algorithm Osd-
pLaplaceL1 is outperformed from the DP algorithm at the
same 25% mark, but this time DAWAz is highly competi-
tive for all policies. This is because the OSDP subroutine of
DAWAz over-reports zero bin counts, which is better than
adding high scale noise to the true bin counts. For brevity
in the rest of our results we report only policies with more
than 25% fraction of non-sensitive records and for  = 1.
In figures 5a and 5b we report the median and 95% per
bin relative error. Overall we see that across error met-
rics, OSDP algorithms offer significant improvements over
DAWA for all fractions of non-sensitive values. Even when
only half the data records are non-sensitive we see that
OSDP algorithms achieve better error rates in MRE and
REL95, which means that the OSDP algorithms have an
advantage in reporting counts of bins with otherwise high er-
ror. Note that DAWAz is not as competitive as we would ex-
pect and is outperformed from OspLaplaceL1. The main
reason is that the policy in the TIPPERS dataset is value
based. So some histogram bins contain only sensitive records,
while others only consist of non-sensitive records. So Osd-
pLaplaceL1 is able to add normal Laplace noise to the
sensitive buckets (ensuring DP) and one-sided noise to non-
sensitive buckets (ensuring OSDP). The overall algorithm
ensures OSDP by sequential composition.
6.3.3.2 Results: DPBench-1D.
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Figure 6: Regret for MRE, across different non-sensitive
ratios and different policies.
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Figure 7: Regret for MRE, across different non-sensitive
ratios and for fixed policy, for  = 1.
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Figure 8: Regret for Rel95, across different non-sensitive
ratios and for fixed policy, for  = 1.
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Figure 9: Regret for MRE for Close policy and fixed non
sensitive ratios.
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Figure 10: Comparison with PDP algorithms for τ = 100
and  = 1.0 measuring the regret of MRE.
In this set of experiments, our goal is to analyze the per-
formance of DP and OSDP algorithms for varying levels of
the closeness of the non-sensitive histogram and the non-
sensitive ratio. Closeness shows how similar x and xns are,
and the non-sensitive ratio ρx = ‖xns‖1/‖x‖1 denotes the
portion of tuples in xns. Note that since we report aggregate
results of similar inputs (e.g., group inputs by policy), the
aggregated value of the loss function might skew the results
due to different error scales between inputs. For this reason,
we report the regret of each algorithm w.r.t. an error mea-
sure Err rather than the absolute value of the error. More
specifically, for histogram x, budget , error measure Err,
and algorithm A ∈ A the regret of A is:
regretErr(A,x, ) =
Err(A(x, ),x)
OPTA(Err,x, )
Main Results: In figure 6 we present our results comparing
performance across different values of the privacy parameter
. Each figure shows results for both policies, across different
values of the non sensitive ratio ρx. Note that y-axis reports
the average regret for MRE of each algorithm w.r.t. a set of
4 OSDP and 2 DP algorithms, which are averaged over the 7
histograms from DPBench-1D. We show results only for the
most competitive algorithms. The dotted line corresponds to
regret equal to 1 and since our results are aggregates, single
algorithms will rarely have average regret equal to 1. Again
we observe that low values of  (i.e., bigger noise scale) fa-
vor the hybrid algorithm DAWAz. The main takeaway is
that for ratios ρx ≤ 0.25 the DP algorithm outperforms the
“pure” OSDP algorithm OsdpLaplaceL1. Also note that
for both  values the qualitative analysis of the results does
not differ by much. For the above reasons, in our next re-
sults we (a) limit ρx ≥ 0.25 and (b) focus on a single  value
and present separate results for Close and Far policies.
Next, in figures 7 and 8 we present our main results for
the MRE and Rel95 error measures respectively. The pri-
vacy parameter  is fixed to 1 and each figure shows the
results for a different policy generator. The y-axis reports
the average regret of each algorithm. For Close policies and
across all non sensitive ratios and error metrics, OSDP algo-
rithms always outperform DP algorithms, with the highest
improvements in high error bins (i.e., Rel95). Even for Far
policies DAWAz outperforms the best performing DP al-
gorithm DAWA for all non-sensitive ratios. This confirms
our insight behind its design, as DAWAz combines the best
of both worlds: it successfully leverages the non-sensitive
records to identify zero cells using OSDP algorithms to en-
hance a state-of-the-art DP algorithm.
In figure 9 we present results for the Close policy and fixed
non-sensitive ratios across datasets. Note that these results
are not aggregate and in the y-axis we report the regret for
a single histogram with a fixed ρx and a fixed policy. Each
group in the x-axis corresponds to a different dataset and
the datasets are sorted with descending sparsity (i.e., Adult
is the sparsest dataset). Again, the dotted line corresponds
to regret equal to 1. In some cases an algorithm other than
the ones shown in the figure achieves a regret of 1 (e.g.,
OsdpRR has regret 1 in Adult), but we do not show them
since they have very high regrets for other datasets (and to
be consistent with our previous figures). Lastly note that
Nettrace is a sorted histogram, which highly favors DAWA
explaining its sudden drop in regret.
In the case of the Close policy, OSDP algorithms offer sig-
nificant performance improvements over using a traditional
DP algorithm, across all datasets. We can see that for the
sparser Adult histogram we achieve an improvement on re-
gret of 25×, this is because the OSDP algorithms can cor-
rectly identify the bins with 0 counts, and incur 0 error on
them. As the sparsity of the datasets decreases we see the
gap between DAWA (the best performing DP algorithm) and
the OSDP algorithms to become smaller. Lastly we observe
that as ρx becomes smaller the advantages of DAWAz be-
come more apparent - since DAWAz uses both the sensitive
and the non-sensitive part of the histogram.
Comparison with PDP: Finally, in Fig. 10, we compare
OsdpLaplaceL1 with the PDP algorithm Suppress (de-
scribed in Section 3.4) with thresholds τ = {10, 50, 100}
on the benchmark datasets. In figure 3.4 we show the two ex-
treme cases for τ = {10, 100} and refer to them Suppress10
and Suppress100 respectively. We observe that Suppress
starts becoming competitive for values of τ ≥ 100, but this
utility comes at a cost of 100 times worse protection from
exclusion attacks (see Theorems 3.1 and 3.4).
7. EXTENSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
One-sided differential privacy (OSDP) presents a new di-
rection for privacy research in that it is the first formal
privacy definition that exploits the sensitive/non-sensitive
dichotomy of data to allow true data to be released with
formal privacy guarantees. This paper focused on motivat-
ing and defining OSDP and highlighting its advantages both
in the context of data sharing tasks where differential pri-
vacy (DP) either does not apply or offers very low utility,
as well as, in situations where DP performs well, but OSDP
appropriately combined with DP offers significant improve-
ment. Below we highlight some of the key extensions that
we believe offer interesting directions of future work.
Policies that go beyond records. In this paper, we con-
sidered policy functions that define whether or not a specific
record is non-sensitive. One could extend this to the case
where a policy specifies a view over the database that is
non-sensitive (like in the work on authorization views [33]),
or a policy that determines that a view is sensitive (negative
authorization [7]). While there has been work on whether
or not a query leaks any information about a view [29, 31],
there is no work that bounds the information to leak (like
DP) about the sensitive records in such a setting.
One-sided differential privacy and constraints. Theo-
rem 3.1 showed that OSDP algorithms ensure freedom from
exlusion attacks as long as an adversary believes the tar-
get record is independent of the rest of the database. As
in the field of differentially private data analysis problems
arise when the records in the database are correlated. For in-
stance, in a location privacy setting, a specific non-sensitive
location may be reachable only through a set of locations
that are all sensitive. Revealing the fact that a user was
in that location (even using our randomized response algo-
rithm) will reveal the fact that the user was in a sensitive
location in the previous time point with certainty, thus re-
sulting in a privacy breach. Designing algorithms for OSDP
in the presence of constraints in an important and interest-
ing avenue for future work.
Policy Specification and Enforcement OSDP defini-
tion and mechanisms assume the presence of an explicit
policy function that partitions data into sensitive nad non-
sensitive classes. As we discussed in the introduction, there
are several application domains where explicit privacy poli-
cies and/or regulations exist that naturally lead to such a
classification. Furthermore, good practice followed by sev-
eral data collectors (e.g., e-commerce sites, search engines,
etc.) empowers users to opt-in or opt-out. Such a prac-
tice as well lends itself directly to explicit policy function.
Nonetheless, if we are to use OSDP in general application
context, mechanisms to specify comprehensive policies that
dictate data sensitivity or, better still, learn such policies,
perhaps through appropriate machine learning techniques
offers rich fertile area for future research. Finally, our fo-
cus in this work has been on appropriate privacy definition
and mechanisms to realize OSDP. We have not focused on
efficient approach to implement OSDP, especially in online
setting wherein user’s may dynamically ask queries.
8. CONCLUSIONS
In this work we presented a new privacy definition called
one-sided privacy that allows for different levels of privacy
guarantees (sensitive or non-sensitive) to be applied to dif-
ferent records in the dataset. The level of protection is deter-
mined by the value of a record, and hence, whether a record
is sensitive or non-sensitive must also be hidden. This makes
the privacy definition unique. We present the fundamental
theory behind the privacy definition, compare it to existing
definitions and present input and output perturbation algo-
rithms. We present case studies where one-sided privacy can
be used, along with effect of our algorithms on the utility of
analyzing the data in these scenarios. We concluded with a
discussion of extensions and open questions for future work.
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10. APPENDIX
10.1 Extended OSDP
We propose a strict generalization of the definition of
OSDP that supports neighboring datasets with different num-
ber of records and under which we can show that the parallel
composition holds.
Definition 10.1 (Extended One-sided P -Neighbors). Let
D, D′ be two databases and P a policy function. D′ is an
extended one-sided P -neighbor of D, i.e., D′ ∈ NeP(D), if
and only if ∃r ∈ D s.t., P (r) = 0, such that: D′ = D − {r}
or D′ = D ∪ {r′}, where r′ ∈ T and r′ 6= r.
Definition 10.2 (Extended One-sided Differential Privacy).
An algorithmM satisfies (P, )-Extended one-sided differen-
tial privacy (eOSDP), if and only if ∀O ⊆ range(M), and
∀D,D′ ∈ NeP(D):
Pr[M(D) ∈ O] ≤ e Pr[M(D′) ∈ O]
Theorem 10.1 (Extended OSDP Equivalence). Any mech-
anism M, that satisfies (P, )-eOSDP also satisfies (P, 2)-
OSDP.
Proof. Given a database D and r ∈ D with P (r) = 0,
let D′ = D − {r} ∪ {r′} an OSDP neighbor of D, i.e.,
D′ ∈ NP(D). Then database D′′ = D ∪ r is such that:
(a) D′′ ∈ NeP(D) and (b) D′ ∈ NeP(D′′). Therefore, for
mechanismM that satisfies (P, )-eOSDP and it holds that
∀O ⊆ range(M):
Pr[M(D) ∈ O] ≤ ePr[M(D′′) ∈ O] ≤ ePr[M(D′) ∈ O] =⇒
Pr[M(D) ∈ O] ≤ e2Pr[M(D′) ∈ O]
Note that the inverse statement of Theorem 10.1 does not
necessarily hold, i.e., (P, 2)-OSDP does not imply (P, )-
eOSDP.
Theorem 10.2 (Parallel Composition). Let D be a database
and D = {D1, · · · , Dn} a partitioning of it. Let M1, . . . ,
Mn be (Pi, i)-eOSDP mechanisms and Pmr be the mini-
mum relaxation of P1, . . . , Pn. Then the compositionM1(Di)◦
. . . ◦Mn(Dn) satisfies (Pmr,max(i))-eOSDP.
Proof. Since under eOSDP, for D′ ∈ NeP(D), we have that
D has either one more or one less record than D′. Thus,
exactly one partition changes in D′, i.e., ∃j ∈ [n], s.t., Dj 6=
D′j and ∀i ∈ [n]\{j}: Di = D′i. Lastly, since any (Pi, i)-
eOSDP mechanism also satisfies (Pmr, i)-eOSDP and only
one partition changed between D and D′, it follows that
M1(Di)◦ . . .◦Mn(Dn) satisfies (Pmr,max(i))-eOSDP.
10.2 Proofs
Proof of Theorem 3.4
Theorem. The Suppress algorithm with threshold τ satis-
fies freedom from exclusion attack for φ = τ .
Proof. Our goal is to bound the posterior odds ratio:
Pr θ(r = x|M(D) ∈ O)
Pr θ(r = y|M(D) ∈ O)
≤ Pr θ(r = x)
Pr θ(r = y)
max
D1,D2
PrM(M(D1) ∈ O)
PrM(M(D2) ∈ O)
Where D is drawn from θ and D1 = D ∪ {x} and D2 =
D ∪ {y}, with x a sensitive record and y any record, i.e.,
P (x) = 0 and P (y) ∈ {0, 1}. Note that PrM(M(D1) ∈
O) = PrM(M(D) ∈ O) for Suppress, since x does not
participate in the computations of M. If P (y) = 0, the
output of Suppress will remain unchanged, since the sensi-
tive record is not considered in the computations at all, i.e.,
maxD1,D2
PrM(M(D1)∈O)
PrM(M(D2)∈O) = 1. If P (y) = 1 the record y is
used from the mechanism and hence by definition of PDP
maxD1,D2
PrM(M(D1)∈O)
PrM(M(D2)∈O) ≤ 
τ , since PrM(M(D1) ∈ O) =
PrM(M(D) ∈ O) for Suppress. Thus,
Pr θ(r = x|M(D) ∈ O)
Pr θ(r = y|M(D) ∈ O) ≤
Pr θ(r = x)
Pr θ(r = y)
· eτ
